In a seminal paper, Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter crime is to impose the severest possible penalty (to maintain adequate deterrence) with the lowest possible probability (to economize on costs of enforcement). We shall call this the Becker proposition (BP). The BP is derived under the assumptions of expected utility theory (EU). However, EU is heavily rejected by the evidence. A range of non-expected utility theories have been proposed to explain the evidence.
Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Becker (1968) opened the way to a rigorous formal economic analysis of crime. Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter a crime is to impose the severest possible penalty with the lowest possible probability. We shall call this the Becker proposition. The intuition is simple and compelling. By reducing the probability of detection and conviction, society can economize on costs of enforcement such as policing and trial costs. But by increasing the severity of the punishment (monetary and non-monetary), the deterrence e¤ect of the punishment is maintained.
The Becker proposition takes a particularly stark form if the decision maker follows expected utility theory (EU) and if we add two assumptions: (1) Risk neutrality or risk aversion. ( 2) The availability of in…nitely severe (monetary and non-monetary) punishments, e.g., capital punishment. With these extra assumptions, the Becker proposition implies that crime would be deterred completely, however small the probability of detection and conviction, as illustrated in Becker's quote at the beginning. 1 Kolm (1973) memorably phrased this as hang o¤enders with probability zero. The Becker proposition (BP) has had a tremendous impact on the economics and law literature and it introduced a formal economic approach to crime. 2 The BP has spawned a great deal of literature that typically relaxes some assumption behind the BP or embeds the BP within a more complex setting in order to see if the BP holds.
How robust is the BP?
The BP might not hold for a variety of reasons. For instance, criminals could be riskseeking (Becker, 1968) . In…nite …nes could be di¢ cult to collect due to bankruptcy constraints (Friedman, 1999; Polinsky and Shavell, 1991) . Because of the danger of falsely convicting an innocent person (a Type-I error), society could face huge welfare losses from large …nes (Andreoni, 1991; Feess and Wholschlegel, 2009; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000b) . High …nes might encourage rent-seeking behavior on the part of law-enforcers to collude in acquitting criminals (Friedman, 1999) . For reasons of norms and fairness society may 1 In the quote, p is the probability of detection and conviction and f is the punishment (monetary and non-monetary). 2 The salience of the Becker proposition in that literature can be gauged from the fact that a Google Scholar search shows that it has been cited 7050 times not accept the severe punishments required by the BP (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a) . Risk averse criminals whose utility enters the social welfare function would be severely hit by very high …nes in the event that they are caught, lowering social welfare (Polinsky and Shavell,1979; Kaplow, 1992) . Pathological criminals are not deterred by high …nes anyway (Colman, 1995) .
The extensions of the Becker proposition noted above have enriched the literature and deepened our understanding of the economics of crime. Like Becker (1968) , these extensions use expected utility theory (EU), a decision theory whose predictions, as we discuss below, are routinely refuted by the evidence .
Our …rst objective is to formalize the BP. Our second objective is to check for the robustness of BP with respect to alternative decision theories that are better supported by the evidence as compared to EU. The third objective of our paper is to outline a formal behavioral approach to crime and punishment that can potentially have a range of applications to related problems.
Expected utility theory, its refutations and the leading alternatives
A common feature of all the robustness tests of the BP brie ‡y outlined in subsection 1.1 above, is that they assume criminals follow expected utility theory (EU). Despite its overwhelming popularity in the literature, EU has been strongly rejected by the evidence gathered over several decades of research. The Allais paradox, in its common ratio and common consequence forms, was an early demonstration of the violation of the independence axiom of EU. Other well documented violations have included preference reversals, violation of framing invariance, violation of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, violation of the dependence of utility on …nal wealth rather than wealth relative to a reference point (reference dependence), con ‡ation of risk aversion with loss aversion, attitudes to risk that depend only on the shape of the utility function, unreasonable risk aversion for large stake gambles if there is risk aversion over small stakes, qualitatively and quantitatively incorrect results when pitted in a race with other decision theories, among many others. 3 EU has two salient features. (1) The objective function is linear in probabilities, and (2) utility is de…ned over …nal levels of wealth. For a range of problems, such as the Allais paradox, it was found that the relaxation of linearity in probabilities provided a solution. This lead to the development of several alternatives. According to Machina (2008) the most popular of these alternatives is rank dependent utility (RDU), developed by Quiggin (1982) . However, RDU retains the second salient feature of EU, namely that utilities are de…ned over …nal wealth levels. RDU can explain everything that EU can explain because EU is a special case of RDU. But, in addition, RDU can explain a range of phenomena that EU is unable to explain.
Empirical evidence arising from several economic phenomena demonstrates strongly, and robustly, the following facts; see Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000) , Starmer (2000) and Wakker (2010) . Individuals derive utility not from …nal wealth levels but changes in wealth relative to a reference level (reference dependence). 4 This partitions the domain of outcomes into gains (when wealth exceeds the reference point) and the domain of losses (when wealth is lower than the reference wealth). Individuals exhibit loss aversion, namely the tendency for losses to bite more than equivalent gains. Furthermore, the utility function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses (diminishing sensitivity). We discuss these features in detail in section 6. The award of the Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman was in recognition for joint work, largely with Amos Tversky. 5 They documented severe violations of EU and provided in its place a successful alternative in the form of prospect theory (PT) also known as …rst generation prospect theory. PT is described in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , which is the second most cited paper in economics since 1970 (see Dellavigna, 2009 ). In PT, both salient features of EU, namely, linearity in probabilities and utility de…ned over …nal wealth, are relaxed. In particular, the second of these two salient features is relaxed by allowing for reference dependence, loss aversion and declining sensitivity. All these features of PT are based on strong experimental evidence. This work was followed by second generation prospect theory, also known as cumulative prospect theory (CP) in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , who incorporated insights from Quiggin's work on RDU into PT (see section 6 below). In conjunction, PT and CP are able to address most of the shortcomings of EU brie ‡y mentioned in the opening paragraph of this subsection. Many economic phenomena require reference dependence, loss aversion and declining sensitivity as essential components. As one might expect, EU and RDU typically do not perform well in the domain of these economic phenomena while PT and CP do far better. The range of such phenomena is very wide and important. In the context of criminal activity, speci…cally tax evasion, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) show that the predictions of EU are both quantitatively incorrect (by up to 100 fold) and qualitatively incorrect. 6 This raises great di¢ culty in applying EU to empirical or theoretical work in 4 In a classic experiment from psychology an individual is asked to dip one hand (hand L) in hot water and another hand (hand R) in cold water. Once the hands become attuned to the respective temperatures, both hands are taken out simultaneously and dipped in lukewarm water. Hand L reports the lukewarm water to be cold while hand R reports the lukewarm water to be hot. 5 Daniel Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel prize in Economics. Sadly, Amos Tversky died in 1996 and there is no provision to receive the Nobel prize postumously. 6 The qualitative incorrectness in this case refers to the Yitzhaki puzzle. Under plausible attitudes to economics. By contrast, the evidence is easily explained by CP. Camerer (2000) documents the superior performance of PT/CP for a range of phenomena that include the disposition e¤ect, asymmetric price elasticities, the excess sensitivity of consumption to income, the equity premium puzzle, elasticities of labour supply and asset pricing, among others. 7 CP can explain everything that EU and RDU can, but the converse is false, hence, CP is the most satisfactory decision theory among the leading alternatives. Indeed, EU and RDU are special cases of CP. Furthermore, CP is very tractable in actual applications. The continued use of EU in the face of ever mounting refutations, better developed, equally tractable and equally rigorous alternative theories that conform much better with the evidence is one of the great puzzles in the economics profession. We do not assume a knowledge of RDU and CP on the part of the reader in this paper. The relevant concepts are developed during the paper when needed.
Research problems, results and some implications
The BP has been extended in several directions (see subsection 1.1 above), yet the analysis has steadfastly continued to assume EU in most cases despite EU having faced intense refutations for several decades. We …nd this puzzling and surprising. 8 A major research aim of our paper is to test if the BP holds under RDU and CP. We …nd that the BP is robust to a consideration of alternative mainstream decision theories. In particular, we …nd that the BP holds for RDU as well as for CP. We also provide a clearer derivation of the BP under EU. A related contribution of our paper is that by addressing a basic crime and punishment problem in a non-expected utility framework, it opens up the way for a consideration of other problems and issues using our framework. Our …ndings have mixed implication for alternative explanations of the violations of the BP outlined brie ‡y in subsection 1.1 above. On the one hand, our …ndings strengthen these alternative explanations because if the BP is violated, it is not on account of a refuted theory, namely, EU. We show that the BP continues to hold under RDU and CP,theories which are con…rmed much better by the evidence. In this sense, the research program for alternative explanations was fortuitously headed in the right direction. On the other hand, because the alternative explanations themselves continued to use EU, it might be risk, EU predicts that when the tax rate increases, taxpayers will evade less. In the limit when the tax rate is a 100%, all income is declared. This contradicts the bulk of evidence; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) for the details. 7 The interested reader can also consult Kahneman and Tversky (2000) , the Nobel lecture by Kahneman (2003) and a review of …eld studies in Dellavigna (2009). 8 Neilson and Winter (1997) make an attempt to apply RDU to a problem of crime but their intention was not to see if BP holds under RDU. They were interested in showing that even if individuals violate EU they could still be risk averse. A much more complete treatment of attitudes to risk under RDU, arising as the product of the shapes of the utility function and the probability weighting function can be found in Wakker (2010). worthwhile to re-examine them in the light of RDU and CP to check if they continue to hold. The latter remark is not purely speculative. In the context of the criminal activity of tax evasion, al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010b) , show that EU gives results that are qualitatively incorrect and quantitatively incorrect.
Organization of the paper
Section 2 formulates a standard economic model of crime. The Becker proposition is considered under EU in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief discussion of probability weighting functions, with particular emphasis on the Prelec (1998) function. Section 5 shows that the Becker proposition holds under RDU and Section 6 shows it also holds under CP. We consider …xed reference points in subsection 6.2, while subsection 6.3 allows for a wider range of reference points as well as heterogeneity among criminals. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The model and assumptions
Suppose that an individual receives income, y 0 , from being engaged in some legal activity and income, y 1 , y 1 > y 0 , from being engaged in some illegal activity. Hence, the bene…t, b, to the perpetrator from the illegal activity is
If engaged in the illegal activity, the individual is caught with some probability p, 0 p 1. If caught, the individual is asked to pay a …ne, F . As in much of the existing literature, particularly Becker (1968) , we use the simplifying assumption that F is the monetary equivalent of all punishments. 9 We assume that,
In particular, it is feasible to levy a …ne at least equal to the bene…t from crime, b. This is true of Examples 1 -3 that we give below, consistent with real world practice and is an assumption that is made in standard models of crime and punishment; see, for instance, Polinsky and Shavell (2007) . Given the enforcement parameters p, F , the individual makes only one choice, to commit the crime or not. This framework nests several important settings. Consider the following examples.
Example 1 (Theft/robbery): Engaging in theft gives a monetary reward b 0. If the thief is caught (with probability p 0) the goods, whose value is b, are impounded and, in addition, the o¤ender pays a …ne, f 0 (or faces other penalties such as imprisonment whose equivalent monetary value is f ). Hence,
Example 2 (Tax evasion): Consider the following widely used model (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) . A taxpayer has taxable incomes z 1 > 0 and z 2 > 0 from two economic activities, both of which are taxed at the rate t > 0. Income z 1 cannot be evaded (for instance, it could be wage income with the tax withheld at source). However, the individual can choose to evade or declare income z 2 .
10 It follows that y 0 = (1 t) (z 1 + z 2 ). Suppose that the taxpayer chooses to evade income z 2 . Hence, y 1 = (1 t) z 1 + z 2 > y 0 and the bene…t from tax evasion is b = tz 2 0. If caught evading, the individual is asked to pay back the tax liabilities owed, b = tz 2 , and an additional …ne f = tz 2 where > 0 is the penalty rate. Hence, F = (1 + ) tz 2 .
Example 3 (Pollution): Consider a …rm that produces a …xed output that is sold for a pro…t, . As a by-product, and conditional on the …rm's existing technology, the …rm creates a level of emissions, E, that is greater than the legal limit, E. With probability p 0 the …rm's emissions are audited by the appropriate regulatory authority. Emissions can be reduced at a cost of c > 0 per unit by making changes to existing technology. Hence, y 0 = c E E and y 1 = so that b = c E E 0 is the bene…t arising from not lowering emissions to the legal requirement. If caught, the …rm is made to pay b = c E E as well as a monetary …ne f 0. Hence, F = f + c E E .
We have not speci…ed the preferences of the individual, yet. In subsequent sections we shall consider, sequentially, the possibilities that the decision maker has expected utility (EU), rank dependent utility (RDU), and cumulative prospect theory (CP) preferences.
The social costs of crime and law enforcement
Let C (p; F ) 0 be the cost to society of law enforcement. Let D (p; F ) be the damage to society caused by crime. We assume that C (0; 0) = 0, i.e., in the absence of any law enforcement, costs of such enforcement are zero. If crime is deterred completely by p = p 0 and F = F 0 then, we assume, D(p 0 ; F 0 ) = 0.
We also assume that C and D are continuous functions of p and F with continuous …rst and second partial derivatives 11 , i.e., C; D 2 C 2 . We denote partial derivatives with 10 Examples include income from several kinds of …nancial assets, domestic work, private tuition, private rent, income from overseas, among many others. In actual practice, tax evasion often takes the form of completely hiding certain taxable activities; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) . 11 C n is the class of continuous functions with continuous partial derivatives up to order n.
subscripts, e.g., C p =
@C @p
and
. We assume that
Thus, the cost of law enforcement can be reduced by reducing the probability of detection and conviction, p. In general, an increase in the punishment, F , will increase the cost of law enforcement (for example, increasing the length of prison sentences). We note, for future reference, a special case below.
De…nition 1 (Ideal …ne): The case C F = 0 can be thought of as that of an ideal …ne, which has a …xed administrative cost and involves a transfer from the o¤ender to the victim or society (so there is no aggregate loss to society other than the …xed administrative cost).
Society' s objective
be the total cost to society of crime. We assume that
Society aims to choose the instruments p and F so as to minimize T (p; F ). The condition in (2.5) ensures that total costs can be reduced by raising the …ne just above zero, hence, F = 0 is not optimal.
A principal-agent interpretation of the model
We can also interpret this model more generally as that of a principal-agent relationship. A principal contracts an agent to perform a certain task in exchange for the monetary reward y 0 . The agent can either carry out his task honestly or can improperly exploit the principal's facilities to enhance his income to y 1 > y 0 . This causes damage, D, to the principal. The principal can introduce a monitoring technology and a system of sanctions at a cost C (p; F ). The total cost to the principal is, thus,
where p is the probability of detection and F is the sanction. The analogue of Becker's proposition, in this case, is to impose the severest sanction on the agent with the minimum probability of detection, i.e., o¤er, what Rasmusen (1994) calls, a boiling in oil contract.
Punishment functions
The objective of minimizing T (p; F ) with respect to p; F can be broken down into two stages. First, we ask whether, for each p, there is a level of punishment, F = '(p), that minimizes T (p; '(p)) given p. If the existence of such an optimal punishment function is assured, then we can ask whether there exists a probability, p, that minimizes T (p; '(p)). Formal de…nitions are given below. First, we de…ne a punishment function (optimal or otherwise), then we de…ne an optimal punishment function. Note that we allow for the possibility of in…nite punishments, i.e., we allow for the possibility that '(p) = 1 for some p.
Proposition 1 (Existence of optimal punishment functions):
De…nition 4 (Cost and …ne elasticities):
C p is the probability elasticity of cost,
C F is the punishment elasticity of cost and
d' dp is the probability elasticity of punishment.
Lemma 1 :
d dp C (p; ' (p)) > 0 if, and only if,
The condition
F is most likely to hold when the costs to society do not increase too rapidly in response to an increase in …nes. It will be satis…ed for an ideal …ne, since 
The hyperbolic punishment function
A popular and tractable subset of '(p) is the hyperbolic punishment function (HPF), H(p).
De…nition 5 : A hyperbolic punishment function, HPF is de…ned by
where c is a positive constant.
The name derives from the fact that in p; F space, the HPF plots as a rectangular hyperbola. Note that, for (2.6), '(0) = 1. The justi…cation for the hyperbolic punishment function is considered in al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011a). The HPF has been widely used in the law and economics …eld. 12 
The Becker proposition under expected utility theory (EU)
We now consider the Becker proposition (BP) under EU. One of the objectives of this section is to give a more satisfactory formal treatment of the BP. 13 Consider an individual with continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing utility of income, u.
If he does not engage in crime, his income is y 0 . In that case, his payo¤ from no-crime, U N C , is given by U N C = u (y 0 ). On the other hand, if the individual engages in crime, his income is y 1 if not caught, but y 1 F y 1 , if caught. Since he is caught with probability, p, his expected utility from crime, EU C , is given by
The individual does not engage in crime if the no-crime condition (NCC ) EU C U N C is satis…ed. Thus, the no-crime condition is
Proposition 2 (Becker, 1968) : Under EU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so that u (y 1 F ) ! 1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F .
We show in Proposition 3 below that (i) not only does the Becker proposition hold for risk-neutral and risk averse criminals, (ii) its implementation is socially desirable because it reduces the total cost of crime, T (p; F ), for society.
Proposition 3 (Becker, 1968) 14 : Under EU, (a) If the individual is risk neutral or risk averse, so that u is concave, then the HPF
will deter crime. It follows that given any probability of detection and conviction, p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently large punishment.
, then reducing p reduces the total social cost of crime and law enforcement, T (p; F ). 12 The following quote from Polinsky and Shavell (2007, footnote 16) testi…es to the importance of the HPF: "[The HPF] or its equivalent, was put forward by Bentham (1789, p.173), was emphasized by Becker (1968) , and has been noted by many others since then." 13 In Becker (1968) the …rst order conditions are given with equality. When the optimum lies on the boundary this poses obvious problems. An intuitive argument is then given in Becker (1968) to justify a boundary solution. We provide the formal underpinning to Becker's informal argument.
14 While Proposition 3(a) is well known from Becker (1968) , Proposition 3(b) is, as far as we know, a new result.
Example 4 : Consider the utility function u (y) = e y . Note that u 0 (y) = e y > 0; u 00 (y) = e y < 0. From the second inequality, we see that this utility function exhibits risk averse behavior. Hence, from Proposition 3 (a) it would be possible to deter crime, however small the probability of detection and conviction.
In contrast to these results, Levitt (2004) argues "... given the rarity with which executions are carried out in this country and the long delays in doing so, a rational criminal should not be deterred by the threat of execution." That might well be true as an empirical …nding. However, this empirical observation is certainly not consistent with the decision maker following EU, under the conditions of Proposition 3. The probability of capital punishment can be made arbitrarily small but it will certainly deter crime under EU (Becker proposition).
Probability weighting functions (PWF)
All mainstream decision theory models that relax the "linearity in probabilities"assumption of EU, e.g., rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP), have one thing in common. Namely, that the decision maker uses a probability weighting function (PWF), denoted by w(p), that transforms probabilities, p. A simple proof, that we omit, can be used to derive the following Proposition. Since the Becker proposition hinges critically on the behavior of decision makers as p ! 0, we now o¤er some de…nitions that establish the relevant terminology. De…nition 8 (Standard probability weighting functions): We shall call the entire class of probability weighting functions that satisfy De…nition 7, for empirically relevant values of , the class of standard probability weighting functions.
Some well known examples of standard probability weighting functions are Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Lattimore, Baker and Witte (1992) and Prelec (1998).
Example 5 (Prelec's probability weighting function): The Prelec (1998) probability weighting function, w : [0; 1] onto ! [0; 1], is one of the most popular and satisfactory probability weighting functions. It is parsimonious, consistent with the stylized facts and has an axiomatic foundation. 15 It is given by w (0) = 0 and
The Prelec function is strictly concave for low probabilities but strictly convex for high probabilities, i.e., it is inverse-S shaped as in w (p) = e The bulk of the empirical evidence points to individuals having an inverse-S shaped weighting function (as in the bold curve in Figure 4 .1). Extensive empirical evidence for this stylized fact is described in Wakker (2010) . From Proposition 5, and as illustrated in Figure 4 .1, the Prelec function is consistent with this stylized fact. 17 According to Prelec (1998, p.505), the in…nite limit in De…nition 7, and Proposition 5(b), captures the qualitative change as we move from improbability to impossibility.
The Becker paradox under rank dependent expected utility
Expected utility has two main features. It is (i) linear in probabilities, and (ii) utility is de…ned over …nal wealth levels. The refutations of EU have lead to the relaxation of both these features. The most common relaxation has been to relax linearity in probabilities. This was motivated initially by the inability of EU to explain various versions of the Allais paradox arising from a violation of the independence axiom. The main alternative to EU in decision theory that arose from work in this direction is rank dependent expected utility (RDU). Machina (2008) describes RDU as the most popular alternative to EU. The objective function under RDU is described in De…nition 9, below. We follow it up with an explanation.
De…nition 9 (Quiggin 1982) Consider the lottery (x 1 ; p 1 ; x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) that pays some monetary amount, x i , with probability, p i , where x 1 x 2 ::: x n . For RDU, the decision weights, j , are de…ned by
where w is a standard probability weighting function (see De…nition 8) . The decision maker's rank dependent utility, RDU, is
RDU o¤ers a huge improvement over EU in terms of predictive success. The main difference between (5.2) and expected utility is that RDU replaces probabilities with decision weights. With this modi…cation to EU, RDU can explain everything that EU can, but the converse is false (e.g., RDU can explain the Allais paradox while EU cannot). 18 The construction of decision weights in (5.1) shows the sense in which cumulative transformations 17 The interested reader can consult al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b) for more details. 18 More formally, to see that EU is a special case of RDU, take the probability weighting function to be w (p) = p. Then, from (5.1), we get i = p i . From (5.2) we then get RDU (x 1 ; p 1 ; x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) = n j=1 p j u (x j ), which is the EU objective function. of probabilities are made under RDU. This ensures that stochastically dominated choices are never made by the decision maker; see Quiggin (1982) . 19 The decision weights in (5.1) may look complicated but they are actually very intuitive. It can be shown that if, for instance, the probability weighting function is convex (concave) throughout then a decision maker who uses (5.1) places much greater (smaller) decision weight on smaller outcomes as compared to larger outcomes. Such a decision maker appears to an outside observer as pessimistic (optimistic). 20 Thus, while (5.1) may appear to be cognitively challenging, it encapsulates simple psychological principles. Almost all versions of RDU use standard probability weighting functions (De…nition 8 and Proposition 5b).
Consider the model of crime in Section 2 and assume that the decision maker uses RDU. Using De…nition 9, the payo¤ from no-crime, the non-risky activity, is U N C = u (y 0 ), while that from crime is
Hence, the no-crime condition (NCC ), RDU C U N C , holds if, and only if,
Proposition 6 : (a) Under RDU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so that u (y 1 F ) ! 1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment, p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F . In other words, the Becker proposition holds. 
where
is continuous in p and F for all p; F with partial derivatives p (p; F ) < 0, for all F and p, and F (p; F ) 0, for all F and p, where the latter inequality is strict for p > 0.
We now give some comparative static e¤ects of the policy instruments, p; F , for the case of RDU in the Proposition below.
Proposition 8 : Suppose that the utility function is unbounded below, so that u (y 1 F ) ! 1 as F ! 1. Then: (a) For every F > b, there exists some p = p c 2 (0; 1) such that for all p p c decision makers choose the legal activity and for all p < p c they choose the illegal activity. (b) For p > 0, there exists some F = F c such that for all F F c decision makers choose the legal activity and for all F < F c they choose the illegal activity.
The Becker proposition under cumulative prospect theory (CP)

An introduction to CP
Recall from the introduction to section 5 that RDU relaxes the assumption of linearity in probabilities. However, like EU, RDU continues to assume that decision makers derive utility from …nal levels of wealth. By contrast, a range of empirical evidence that has a rich history in psychology and has been robustly con…rmed in thousands of experiments shows that decision makers behave in the following manner. 21 (i) They derive utility from changes in wealth relative to some reference point and not …nal wealth levels (reference dependence). This partitions the domain of outcomes into the domain of gains and the domain of losses relative to the reference point.
(ii) Losses bite more than equivalent gains (loss aversion). (iii) The utility function is concave in the domain of gains but convex in the domain of losses (declining sensitivity). Hence, in each domain there is diminished sensitivity to a move away from the reference point. We now outline cumulative prospect theory (CP), the second generation of prospect theory due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . CP is rigorous, has axiomatic foundations, is consistent with much of the evidence and has better explanatory power relative to EU and RDU. 22 Consider a lottery of the form L = (y m ; p m ; y m+1 ; p m+1 ; :::; y 1 ; p 1 ; y 0 ; p 0 ; y 1 ; p 1 ; :::; y n ; p n ) , where y m ::: y 0 ::: y n are the outcomes, possibly wealth levels, and p m ; :::; p n are the corresponding probabilities, such that P n i= m p i = 1 and p i 0. The reference point for wealth is denoted by y 0 . 23 Thus, we have m outcomes in the domain of losses 21 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Starmer (2000) , Wakker (2010) , al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b). 22 Readers interested in the axiomatic developments can follow up the references in Wakker (2010) . The empirical success of CP is highlighted and described in several places; see for instance Kahneman and Tvesky (2000) , Starmer (2000) and Wakker (2010) . 23 and n outcomes in the domain of gains for a total of m + n + 1 outcomes.
In CP, decision makers derive utility from wealth relative to a reference point for wealth, y 0 . In order to capture this fact, we de…ne lotteries in incremental form (also sometimes known as "prospects"; hence, the name "prospect theory").
De…nition 10 (Lotteries in incremental form or 'prospects') Let x i = y i y 0 ; i = m; :::; n be the increment in wealth relative to y 0 when the outcome is y i and x m ::: x 0 = 0 ::: x n . Then, a lottery in incremental form (or a prospect) is: L = (x m ; p m ; x m+1 ; p m+1 ; :::; x 1 ; p 1 ; x 0 ; p 0 ; x 1 ; p 1 ; :::; x n ; p n ) .
(6.1)
Denote by L P the set of all prospects of the form given in (6.1).
Remark 1 : An outcome is in the domain of gains if x i 0 and in the domain of losses if x i 0. Thus, the reference outcome, x 0 = 0 is in both domains.
De…nition 11 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979) . A utility function, v(x), under CP is a continuous, strictly increasing, mapping v : R ! R that satis…es:
is concave for x 0 (declining sensitivity for gains). 3. v (x) is convex for x 0 (declining sensitivity for losses). 4. v ( x) > v (x) for x > 0 (loss aversion, e.g., a loss of $1 is more painful than the gain of $1 is pleasurable).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the following utility function which has di¤erent shapes in the domain of gains and loss.
where ; ; are constants. The coe¢ cients of the power function satisfy 0 < < 1, 0 < < 1.
1 is known as the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. The utility function in (6.2) …ts well the data in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated that ' ' 0:88 and ' 2:25. This utility function also has an axiomatic foundation.
25 24 Concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses does not mean, however, that the decision maker is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The reason is that attitudes to risk are also in ‡uenced by the shape of the probability weighting function. See, for instance, the four-fold classi…cation of risk outlined in Kahneman and Tversky (2000) . See Wakker (2010) for a formal textbook treatment. 25 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assert (but do not prove) that the axiom of preference homogeneity ((x; p) y ) (kx; p) ky) generates the value function in (6.2). al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) give a formal proof, as well as some other results (e.g. that is necessarily identical to ).
We now show how the decision weights are constructed under CP. This is the analogue of the construction of decision weights under RDU (see De…nition 9) . The main di¤erence from RDU, in this respect, is that under CP, one computes decision weights separately in the domain of gains and losses. In principle, one could use a probability weighting function, w + , for the domain of gains and a di¤erent weighting function, w , for the domain of losses. However, the empirical evidence indicates that these functions are very similar so, as in Prelec (1998), we set w + = w = w. As in RDU, w is a standard probability weighting function (see De…nition 8).
De…nition 13 (Value function): A decision maker using CP maximizes the following value function de…ned over L P ,
where the utility function, v, is de…ned in De…nition 11 and the decision weights are de…ned in De…nition 12.
Fixed reference points and …xed punishment levels
Let the reference incomes for crime and no-crime, be respectively, y c and y nc , assumed to be …xed in this subsection. 27 Then, using reference dependence, the payo¤ from not committing crime is V N C = v (y 0 y nc ) . (6.4) 26 Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005) …nd that there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the curvature of the weighting function for gains and losses. For the Prelec function (see Example 5), we know that the parameter controls the curvature. However, the elevation (which in the Prelec function is controlled by the parameter ) can be di¤erent in the domain of gains and losses. Empirically, however, it appears that = 1 or is very close to 1. 27 In the original version of CP, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , the reference point is …xed. In their third generation prospect theory, denoted by P T 3 , Schmidt et al. (2008) suggest using state-dependent reference points. However, the model by Schmidt et al. (2008) relies on reference dependent subjective expected utility of Sugden (2003) and so P T 3 is linear in probabilities (as is, of course, EU). Thus, P T 3 cannot address the inverse S-shape of the probability weighting function. For that reason we do not follow P T 3 , but we exploit it's insight of using state dependent reference points in section 6.3.
Recall that the outcomes under CP are split into the domain of gains and losses. 28 We make the plausible assumption that the decision maker who commits a crime is in the domain of gains if not caught and in the domain of losses if caught. Thus, if caught (with probability p), the outcome, y 1 F , is in the domain of losses (i.e., y 1 F y c 0). If not caught (with probability 1 p), the outcome, y 1 , is in the domain of gains (i.e., y 1 y c 0). Thus, we have one outcome each in the domain of losses and gains. 29 Using
De…nition 12, the respective decision weights are w (p) and w (1 p). 30 Then, under CP, the individual's payo¤ from committing a crime is given by
The no crime condition (NCC) in the case of CP is V C V N C , which is equivalent to
From (6.6), ceteris-paribus, an increase in …nes, F , reduces the LHS and so makes it more likely for the NCC to be satis…ed. Hence, as one would expect, an increase in …nes reduces crime.
The NCC depends on the two reference points, y nc and y c , assumed …xed in this section. Proposition 9 : Assume CP with …xed reference points, y nc and y c , and a utility function v that is unbounded below, so that v (y 1 F y c ) ! 1 as F ! 1, ((6.2) for example). Then, given a probability of detection, p > 0, no matter how small crime can be deterred with a su¢ ciently high punishment, F . Thus, the Becker proposition holds under CP.
Under the conditions of Proposition 9, the Becker proposition holds under CP. The reader might wonder if this result is due to the special assumption of …xed reference points. In subsection 6.3, below, we show that the Becker proposition is robust enough to survive a relaxation of this restriction.
Alternative speci…cations of reference points under CP
The result (Proposition 9) in subsection 6.2, above, assumed …xed reference points. We now relax this assumption. We make four assumptions, A1-A4, in this subsection. 28 It is possible to have all outcomes in the domain of gains or all outcomes in the domain of losses but this is not the case for our problem. 29 In the context of tax evasion, Example 2, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010b) , show that the legal after-tax income is the unique reference point such that for all levels of declared income, the taxpayer is in the domain of loss if caught and in the domain of gains if not caught. 30 In the special case of one outcome each in the domain of gains and losses, point transformations of probabilities coincide with cumulative transformations.
Assumption A1 (Hyperbolic Punishment function, HPF):
The punishment function is the hyperbolic punishment function, F = ' (p) = b=p (see De…nition 5) , where b = y 1 y 0 is the bene…t from crime to the perpetrator.
Assumption A2 (Power form of utility):
We use the utility function in (6.2) with = (as already noted, this is consistent with the evidence and has axiomatic foundations). Prelec (1998) function, Example 5), which is consistent with the empirically observed inverse-S shape of a probability weighting function.
Assumption A4 (Heterogeneity in reference points):
To enable a formulation that nests several interesting cases, we describe the reference incomes from crime and nocrime as follows. Take the reference income from crime, y c , as the expected income from crime, i.e.,
The reference income from no-crime, y nc , is speci…ed as some fraction, 0, of the reference income from crime, i.e.,
where (to be interpreted below) is distributed across the population with support, 0; , > 1. This is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model.
We now analyze our model of crime when the decision maker uses CP and Assumptions 1-4 hold.
Using Assumption 1, for the HPF, ' (p) = b=p. Using (2.1) we get that
Using (6.9), the reference incomes, y c , y nc , in (6.7) and (6.8) are Depending on the value of , we get three important cases.
(i) Socially responsible individuals (0 < 1): In this case, from (6.11) we get (1 ) y 0 > 0, i.e., income relative to the reference point from not committing the crime is positive. Such an individual feels positively rewarded on account of his honesty.
(ii) Regretful individuals (1 < ): In this case (6.11) implies that (1 ) y 0 < 0. Such an individual experiences regret from not committing the crime and having to forego the higher income from crime.
(iii) Individuals with reference income equal to the rational expectation of income ( = 1): The recent literature has suggested that the reference point could be the rational expectation of income, which in this perfect foresight model equals the expected income level. 31 By direct calculation, the expected income from no-crime is y 0 while the expected income from crime is y 1 p' (p). From (6.10), this corresponds to a value of = 1. Thus, for the case of rational expectations of income we get y c = y nc = y 0 .
Proposition 10 : Suppose that the decision maker follows CP and Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then the Becker proposition holds for all three kinds of decision makers, namely, socially responsible, regretful and those who have rational expectations.
We have argued that CP is the most satisfactory decision theory among the mainstream alternatives. It can explain everything that EU (or its variants such as generalized expected utility) or RDU can explain but the converse is false. Proposition 10 demonstrates the resilience of the Becker proposition even when the decision maker follows CP and a su¢ ciently wide range of reference point behaviors is allowed for.
Loss aversion and the extent of crime
An important consideration in models of crime has been the e¤ect of risk aversion on the decision to commit a crime. In RDU and CP, however, one cannot infer the degree of risk aversion simply from the magnitude of the parameter in the utility function in (6.2). The reason is that under EU, which is characterized by linearity in probabilities, risk attitudes are captured entirely by the shape of the utility function. For instance, under EU, concavity of utility implies and is implied by risk aversion.
By contrast, when linearity in probabilities is relaxed, as in RDU and CP (see De…n-itions 9 and 12), then risk aversion is determined jointly by the shape of the probability weighting function and the shape of the utility function. Indeed in CP it can be shown that there is a rich four-fold pattern of attitudes to risk that is supported by the evidence. 32 Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) show that there is "no risk aversion over and above loss aversion". In other words, it is quite possible that what empirical researchers are picking out as risk aversion is really caused by loss aversion instead. 33 Therefore, it is worth analyzing the e¤ect of loss aversion on crime in the model that we set out above.
The individuals in our model make one of two possible decisions: To engage in the legal activity or the illegal activity. From Proposition 10, under the conditions of the Becker proposition (p ! 0; F ! 1), and Assumptions A1-A4, all individuals decide to opt for the legal activity. Hence, an increase in loss aversion by making the consequences of the illegal activity even worse, has no impact on individual decisions. In other words, as is typically the case in mechanism design problems, we get a corner solution that entirely eliminates crime and so many of the comparative static e¤ects are simply zero. Therefore, in order to isolate the impact of loss aversion we make the following assumption.
5. Assumption A5 (Punishments bounded above): We assume that for whatever reasons, say, those mentioned in subsection 1.1 in the introduction, F max < 1. 34 Hence, some individuals are not dissuaded from crime.
Let us then look at the impact of the loss aversion parameter, , on the three kinds of individuals when assumptions A1, A4, A5 hold (we do not require assumptions A2, A3 for the results in this subsection). If g > 0 then all individuals with 0 min f0; S g will not commit the crime, whereas all socially responsible individuals with > min f0; S g will commit the crime. It is straightforward to check that @g @ > 0. Hence, an increase in loss aversion, 32 Under CP, the four-fold pattern is as follows; see Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Kahneman and Tversky (2000, p. 56 ). In the domain of gains, individuals are risk loving for small probabilities and risk averse for larger probabilities. In the domain of losses individuals are risk loving for large probabilities and risk averse for small probabilities. 33 See also, for instance, Kahneman and Tversky (2000) , Kahneman (2003) , Marquis and Homer (1996) and Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2004) . 34 Thus, the Becker prescription (p ! 0; F ! 1) does not hold.
by increasing S , reduces the extent of crime in society. The intuition is that an increase in loss aversion makes the existing level of punishment even more onerous, hence, reducing the incentive to engage in the illegal activity. If g < 0 then all socially responsible people commit the crime anyway and an increase in has no e¤ect on the extent of crime for such people. 
When h > 0, all regretful individuals for whom 1 < minf R ; g will not commit the crime while all those with > R will commit the crime. It is simple to check that @h @ > 0. Hence, R is increasing in . Therefore, as in in the case of socially responsible individuals, an increase in loss aversion, by increasing R , reduces the extent of crime. When h < 0, all regretful individuals will commit the crime and so an increase in loss aversion will have no e¤ect on the extent of crime. Then all rational individuals will commit the crime if their loss aversion is low enough in the sense that < and not commit the crime otherwise.
Conclusions
The Becker proposition, summarized eloquently in Kolm's (1973) phrase "hang o¤enders with probability zero", is a cornerstone in the 'economics and law' literature and has provided the basis for much further development of the …eld. A sizeable literature addresses the Becker paradox in an expected utility (EU) framework and considers several worthwhile extensions. We argue that it is very di¢ cult to reconcile EU with the evidence, a well known fact, but, to our mind, not given enough prominence in the law and economics literature. Hence, we re-examine the Becker paradox from the perspective of alternative mainstream non-linear decision theories that …t the evidence much better than EU. These theories are as tractable as EU and equally rigorous. Two main alternatives that we consider are rank dependent expected utility (RDU), which, Machina (2008) describes as the most popular alternative to the EU model and cumulative prospect theory (CP), the Nobel prize winning work of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . The Becker proposition reemerges under RDU and CP.
When put under the lens of CP, in a standard model of crime, the Becker proposition is robust to several plausible assumptions about the reference points of potential criminals. We allow for heterogeneity among potential criminals in terms of their reference points, which allows us to consider behavior that is consistent with rational expectations, regret and social responsibility. In each case, so long as the decision maker is rational (as opposed to being pathological) the Becker proposition holds under CP.
In addition to demonstrating that the Becker proposition holds under RDU and CP, our paper serves two alternative purpose as well. First, we give a more satisfactory formal account of BP. Second, we demonstrate how a standard model of crime can be analyzed under these alternative decision theories. Our analysis gives readers a feel for the possible problems that could be analyzed under alternative decision theories and demonstrates that the analysis under these alternative theories is rigorous and tractable. This should give further impetus to the emerging literature on Behavioral Law and Economics.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the proofs of (a) and (b) see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011, Proposition 1), (c) then follows using the identity d dp
Finally, (d) is an immediate consequence of (c).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof of Proposition 2:
Immediate from the NCC (3.1).
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) The NCC (3.1) is clearly satis…ed for p = 1 and F b = y 1 y 0 . Let F = ' (p) be a di¤erentiable punishment function. The NCC in (3.1) continues to hold, as p declines from 1, if, and only if d dp We …rst prove (a). Let F > b. At p = 0, (0; F ) = u (y 1 ) > u (y 0 ) so the individual commits the crime. At p = 1, (1; F ) = u (y 1 F ) < u (y 0 ) so the individual does not commit the crime. Since (p; F ) is continuous, there exists some p c at which (p c ; F ) = u (y 0 ). Since p < 0, for all p p c , (p c ; F ) u (y 0 ) and so individuals do not commit the crime. For all p < p c , (p c ; F ) > u (y 0 ) and so individuals commit the crime.
Part (b) can be proved in an analogous manner. Let p > 0. At F = 0, (p; 0) = u (y 1 ) > u (y 0 ), hence, all individuals commit the crime. Because u (y 1 F ) ! 1 < u (y 0 ), as F ! 1, no individual commits the crime for su¢ ciently large F . Since (1) is continuous, (2) (p; 0) > u (y 0 ), and (3) (p; F ) < u (y 0 ) for su¢ ciently large F , there exists some critical value F c at which (p; F c ) = u (y 0 ). Since F < 0 for F F c , (p; F c ) u (y 0 ) and so individuals do not commit the crime. For F < F c , (p; F c ) > u (y 0 ) and so individuals commit the crime.
Proof of Proposition 9: Immediate from the NCC (6.6).
Proof of Proposition 10:
We have computed income relative to the reference point for the legal activity in (6.11). For our model of crime, using (6.10) and Assumption 1, we now compute the income relative to the reference point in each state from the criminal activity. We now use (8.5) to analyze the three cases, 0 < 1, 1 < , and = 1. Taking the limits as p ! 0 in (8.9) we get that 10) which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for regretful individuals.
3. Individuals with rational expectations ( = 1). In this case y 0 (1 ) = 0. Recalling that v(0) = 0 (see De…nition 11), the analogue of the NCC in (8.8), (8.10) is 1 + 1 < 0, which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for individuals with rational expectations.
